Fourth Amendment
Professor Mark J. Richards
2012
I. Text of the fourth amendment
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
II. The shift to a less libertarian view of the fourth
amendment
A. Probable cause
1. Generally, probable cause is required for a search and
seizure to pass constitutional muster. Aguilar v. Texas (378 U.S. 108, 1964)
established two independent requirements for probable cause in cases involving
informants. Police must explain how informants know what they know, and why the
police believe that the information is accurate. The police need to prove
probable cause on both prongs of the test. Prior to 1983, a failure on the part
of the government to meet either one of these requirements meant that the search
lacked probable cause and would most likely be held unconstitutional.
2. However, the 1983 Illinois v. Gates (462 U.S. 213)
decision began the move toward a new legal regime by holding that the two
requirements were no longer independent. In a closely related 1984 decision
(Massachusetts. v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727), the Court held that the "totality
of the circumstances" is enough to justify a finding of probable cause,
and stated that more deference should be given to findings of probable cause by
lower courts and magistrates.
B. Exclusionary rule
1. Previously, the Court had established that evidence which
was obtained through searches based on defective warrants lacking probable
cause was to be excluded from consideration in a defendant’s conviction because
the means of obtaining such evidence violated the fourth amendment (see Weeks
v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 1914, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 1961). This is the
exclusionary rule, and it served as a major check on police violations of the
fourth amendment until it was eviscerated by Leon and Sheppard.
2. Good faith exception
Two 1984 companion cases, United States v. Leon (468 U.S.
902) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard (468 U.S. 981). Leon and Sheppard
established a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary
rule no longer applies to situations where the police, acting in good faith,
seize evidence in the context of reliance on a warrant which lacks probable
cause. Good faith means that the police reasonably believe that the warrant was
properly issued. In other words, the police can seize evidence based on a
warrant that lacks probable cause, but the evidence can still be used against
the defendant if the police acted in good faith.
3. Inevitable discovery exception
Two additional 1984 cases also carved out exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. If the police would have inevitably discovered (Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431) the illegally obtained evidence or obtained it through
other independent sources (Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796), it does not need to
be excluded.
4. Bottom line
The good faith and inevitable discovery exceptions to the
exclusionary rule indicate that the Court will be generally less sympathetic to
the claims of the accused in search and seizure cases. See: Herbert M. Kritzer
and Mark J. Richards. 2005. "The Role of Law in the Supreme Court's Search
and Seizure Jurisprudence." American Politics Research 33
(January): 33-55.
III. Exceptions to warrant requirement (See Epstein and
Walker 2010, 460-462)
A. Consent
B. Terry searches
1. Terry v. Ohio (1968) permits an officer to frisk an
individual under investigation when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that
the individual is armed and dangerous.
2. Terry searches are limited to weapons that could be used
to harm officers or others nearby.
C. Plain-view, plain-feel exceptions
1. In conducting a stop or a Terry search, if the officer
observes an object that plainly appears to contraband, the officer may
constitutionally seize the contraband (Michigan v. Long 1983). This is the plain-view
exception. The rationale is that no reasonable expectation of privacy has been
invaded, so this does not constitute an additional, independent search.
2. The plain-feel exception is analogous to the plain-view
exception. "If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer
clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy
beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons" Minnesota
v. Dickerson (508 U.S 366, 1993).
D. Search incident to arrest
E. Preventing loss of evidence
F. Hot pursuit
G. Drug dogs
H. Areas where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
(e.g. airport security screening)
IV. U.S. v. Leon (468 U.S. 902, 1984) and Massachusetts v.
Sheppard (468 U.S. 981, 1984)
A. Facts
What was the problem with the warrant issued in the Leon
case?
Lacked probable cause
B. Issue
Should the fourth amendment exclusionary rule be modified so
as not to prohibit the prosecutor's use of evidence "obtained by officers
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause"?
Should the unconstitutionally obtained evidence used against
Leon be excluded?
C. Holdings (White)
1. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not prohibit
the prosecutor's use of evidence "obtained by officers acting in
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral
magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause."
2. Exclusion is appropriate when:
-The judge issuing the warrant was misled by information on
an affidavit that the officer "knew was false or would have known was
false except for his reckless disregard for the truth."
-The officer relies on a warrant issued by a judge who
failed to act in a neutral and detached manner.
-The officer unreasonably believes that probable cause
exists.
-"A warrant is so fatally deficient - i.e. in failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized - that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid."
3. The unconstitutionally obtained evidence used against
Leon should not be excluded.
D. Reasoning
1. There are costs to imposing the exclusionary rule; it
undermines truth-finding and allows some guilty criminals to go free or plea
bargain to reduced sentences.
2. The exclusionary rule is justified by its effect on
deterring unconstitutional police searches. However, if the officer is acting
reasonably and in good faith, then the rule does not have a deterrent effect in
that situation.
3. The exclusionary rule does not deter judges who issue
warrants, because judges have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions. Therefore, the police should not be punished when judges issue
faulty warrants.
4. The text of the fourth amendment does not require the
exclusionary rule.
5. Officer Rombach acted reasonably and in good faith,
despite the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was not sufficient
probable cause to support the warrant.
E. Concurrence
Blackmun argues that if the effect of the ruling is to
discourage police compliance with the fourth amendment, the Court may
reconsider the ruling.
F. Dissent (Brennan and Marshall)
1. "The right to be free from the initial invasion of
privacy and the right of exclusion are coordinate components of the central
embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." (See
Weeks and Mapp.)
2. The fourth amendment restrains the government as a whole,
not just the police, so the majority's distinction between the deterrent
effects on the police and judges is not textual. Also, both the police and the
judiciary are involved in the singular government action of the search.
3. Weighing the costs of exclusion of evidence due to
unconstitutional searches and seizures is improper. Such actions are
categorically prohibited by the fourth amendment.
4. 1979 GAO study indicates that only 0.4% of all cases
declined by federal prosecutors were declined due to illegal search problems.
5. The ruling will encourage police ignorance of the law,
and discourage paying careful attention to constitutional warrant requirements.
The holding will also discourage careful judicial review of warrant decisions,
because even if the judge improperly issues a warrant, the decision will not be
overturned if the police acted in good faith.
V. Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009)
A. Facts
Who was Redding?
Why was she searched?
How was she searched?
B. Issue
C. Holding
D. Reasoning (Souter)
1. What is the standard in a school setting for level of suspicion needed to justify a search?
1. What is the standard in a school setting for level of suspicion needed to justify a search?
2. Was there enough evidence to justify a limited search? What
could be searched?
3. Why does a search of her bra and underpants go too far?
E. Thomas, concurring in judgment and dissenting in part
1. Why would he hold that the search did not violate the
fourth amendment?
2. Why does the dangerousness of the drug not matter?
3. What are the negative policy implications of the Court’s
decision